Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 13
Number 4 Vol. 13, No. 4 Climate Change
and Global Security

Article 7

Why Climate Change and State Subsidies Will Collide to Create
Fishery Conflict
Jonathan H.C. Kelman
Arizona State University, jonathan.kelman@asu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss

pp. 96-108
Recommended Citation

Kelman, Jonathan H.C.. "Why Climate Change and State Subsidies Will
Collide to Create Fishery Conflict." Journal of Strategic Security 13, no. 4
(2020) : 96-108.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1869
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/7
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic
Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Why Climate Change and State Subsidies Will Collide to Create
Fishery Conflict
Abstract
Climate change, combined with rising global demand for seafood products, will lead to
greater conflict over remaining fisheries. Warming and acidifying oceans are shifting the
availability of oxygen and nutrients that are necessary to maintain fish stocks. These
changes are likely to increase conflict, both interstate and intrastate, in several important
ways. For one, the fish stocks that are already under stress from demand for seafood
protein are also shifting location. Most significantly, scarcity will likely draw in greater
state involvement in fisheries. As traditional fleets exhaust their territorial waters,
domestic political pressure will lead to greater state investment in distant water fishing
(DWF) fleets to access fish stocks on the high seas and in the Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) of other states. DWF fleets are destabilizing because they can easily access fishing
zones with low levels of enforcement. Their industrial scale and low level of transparency
means that they are also more likely to engage in Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
(IUU) fishing activities. States are also more likely to intervene militarily to protect their
state-support DWF fleets.
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Introduction
The total global wild catch of fish leveled off in the 1980s, though fishing
effort—measured in labor hours and capital investments in fishing
vessels—has continued to increase. One third of global marine species are
overfished or depleted, and another 59.9 percent of stocks were being
fished at their maximum sustainable level. Thus, only 7 percent of species
are currently underfished from a sustained yield perspective. Meanwhile,
global seafood consumption has continued to rise at more than twice the
rate of population growth since the 1960s.1 Many of these figures would be
considerably more dire if not for the rising role of regional fishery
management organizations (RFMOs) and aquaculture. That said, a
number of reports in the natural sciences predict that anthropogenic
climate change, combined with further population growth and affluence,
will squeeze this equation considerably further.2 The resulting scarcity,
large scale shifts in fishery access, and resultant state policies are virtually
guaranteed to increase conflict over fisheries, and likely on a scale far
larger than in the past. This is a significant statement, as fishery conflicts
are neither new nor rare. Mitchell and Prins found that one quarter of
militarized disputes between democracies in the second half of the 20th
century concerned fisheries specifically.3 The Cod Wars between the
United Kingdom and Iceland in the 1960s and 1970s are perhaps the most
prominent examples of such conflicts, but they are by no means alone.
Existing literature on the effects of climate change and fisheries has
correctly pointed to the increased likelihood of conflict.4 Largely left out of
this discussion, at least thus far, has been the role of distant water fishing
fleets, and state support of such fleets, in propagating that risk. Through a
variety of mechanisms, anthropogenic climate change will reduce the total
amount of edible sea life in the oceans as well as scramble the location of
remaining fish. Forced to undertake greater effort to catch a declining
number of fish, fishing industries in much of the world will pressure their
respective governments for greater support in order to bolster their
livelihood and remain in business. Many states will choose to encourage,
via subsidies, the creation or expansion of distant water fishing (DWF)
fleets, vessels capable of pursuing fish to all corners of the oceans. 5 This
subsidized expansion of DWF fleets will inevitably contribute to further
degradation of ocean biomass as well as conflict between states. The long
distance capabilities of DWF fleets mean that they can access much of the
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world, thereby adding additional, if nonlocal, actors to any existing
fisheries. Furthermore, the activities of DWF fleets are notoriously opaque,
and large scale DWF operations can easily undertake illegal, unreported
and unregulated (IUU) fishing, thus further destabilizing existing fisheries
management.6 Thus, the challenges of climate change will induce states to
invest in DWF fleets, and it is these fleets and their activities that are likely
to induce conflict and further biodiversity loss. States may view their DWF
fleets as proxy navies and may be inclined to use displays of hard power to
protect their investments.
Climate Change and Fisheries
It is worth some discussion of how anthropogenic climate change will
likely affect fisheries in particular. An increase in average ocean
temperature is a relatively straightforward result of climate change, albeit
one with especially wide-ranging effects for fisheries. Some 93 percent of
the heat from anthropogenic climate change has been absorbed by the
planet’s oceans.7 The result is that the average ocean surface temperatures
have increased 0.7 C between 1900 and 2016, and will rise another 0.6 to
2.0 C by 2100.8 Much of this warming will be concentrated in the
Northern Hemisphere. Warming oceans have several important effects on
fisheries. Rising temperatures will push many species to higher latitudes
as they seek to maintain their preferred water temperature. Raising the
temperature of water also decreases the solubility of oxygen, which means
that warmer oceans can carry less of the oxygen that most aquatic
organisms need to breathe. Thus, warming waters, especially when
combined with agricultural runoff, are contributing to expanded dead
zones in many coastal regions, where few species can survive. Rising
surface temperatures are also likely to impact the intensity and direction
of ocean currents, especially when combined with changes in ocean
salinity as less of the planet’s freshwater is kept in frozen storage.
Weakened or shifting currents will change the nutrient distribution in the
ocean, which will in turn change the location and productivity of fisheries. 9
Ocean acidification is another important effect with wide-ranging impacts.
While the planet’s oceans have served as an enormous depot for much of
humanity’s carbon emissions, that carbon dioxide has not simply
disappeared. Rather, it has been transformed into carbonic acid, gradually
decreasing the pH of ocean water. Earth’s oceans have absorbed 30
percent of all anthropogenic carbon emissions, and thus ocean acidity has
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increased 26 percent since the dawn of the industrial revolution.10 While
it is not yet clear what direct effect if any the decrease in pH will have on
larger organisms, it is well established that coral and other shellfish are
quite sensitive to water acidity. Because their shells are derived from basic
limestone, many mollusks are unable to tolerate more acidic ocean water.
The loss of coral is particularly problematic from a fisheries standpoint,
given that a sizable portion of edible ocean species depend on coral reefs at
some stage in their lifecycle. Thus, ocean acidification will likely reduce
shellfish catches directly as well as other species more indirectly. 11
In all, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
predicts that the maximum catch within the world’s EEZs will decrease
between 2.8 and 12.1 percent by 2050, depending on the concentration of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere by that time.12 There are
several reasons why the impacts are likely to be more dire than these
figures might suggest. For one, globally commercial fishing employs 56
million people, and fish exports alone were worth $152 billion in 2017.13
More than half of that figure originated in the developing world. 14 Thus,
even a single digit decline in total catch would represent a substantial
economic loss, especially for coastal regions. Furthermore, the human
population of 2050 is on track to be above nine billion, and thus demand
for protein is all but certain to be higher as well. Much of the developing
world depends on seafood for 30 to 70 percent of protein in their diet.15
Thus, even a small decline in total catch would likely have a substantial
impact on food security. Second, the relatively low estimates of average
global decline mask huge variation between regions. Fisheries near the
poles are likely to see an expansion of available biomass, whereas those in
tropical regions will see enormous decline. The fisheries of Greenland and
Siberia, for example, are projected to increase under most scenarios,
whereas some fisheries in the tropical Pacific will likely be eliminated
entirely under most warming models.16 Thus, access to productive
fisheries will be scrambled at best, with the greatest declines concentrated
in the parts of the world with the most food insecurity and the highest
dependence on artisanal fishing for protein. Furthermore, it is worth
noting that 2050 is a relatively near milestone in the timeline of climate
change. Continued warming beyond 2050 will increase the severity of the
above trends. For instance, it is projected that unmitigated climate change
will result in a decrease in global fisheries of between 16.2 and 25.1 percent
by 2100.17
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Climate Change and Fishery Conflict
The shifts brought about by climate change do not bode well for fisheries
conflict. For one, increasing population and affluence, coupled with
generally scarcer sea life, will likely lead to higher market prices for ocean
products.18 The economic importance of fisheries will likely be increased
for both small scale, artisanal fisheries and large commercial fleets alike.
Higher market prices and harder to find quarries will provide incentive for
state and nonstate actors alike to take increasingly drastic or risky actions
to maintain their livelihoods. The result will be more conflict between
states for access to fisheries, and more IUU fishing in general. In many
cases the effects will be cascading in nature. For instance, the influx of
large, commercial-scale Chinese fishing fleets into North Korean waters
has largely pushed the small scale DPRK fishermen farther from port and
into Russian waters in search of squid, despite the fact that DPRK fishing
vessels are generally too small for such a voyage.19
Climate change will also make existing fisheries agreements more difficult
to manage, even without expansion of DFFs. Many individual global
fisheries are regulated by Regional Fishery Management Organizations,
which cooperatively set rules for fishing stakeholders within a
geographically bound area. For one, rising water temperatures and
shifting nutrient flows are altering the range of fish. As many species have
spread toward higher latitudes, some RFMOs have become less relevant
since the species they focus on may have moved out of the management
organization’s jurisdiction. Those same species may have moved into a
different RFMO, or into the EEZ of a specific state that was not a party to
any previous agreement. This process creates a new stakeholder, and they
may be uninterested in recognizing the interests of previous actors. Thus,
many states, even those that were previously good-faith participants in
RFMOs, may find themselves high and dry as fish populations shift.
Iceland serves as a good example on both ends of this dynamic. Icelandic
fisheries have suffered as traditional catches like capelin, Blue whiting and
cod have moved further north into colder waters. This is significant, since
cod fishing alone represents $1 billion to the Icelandic economy. At the
same time, mackerel have moved north into Iceland’s EEZ. The north
Atlantic mackerel fishery is co-managed by the European Union, Norway
and the Faroe Islands. Icelandic fishermen have been relatively eager to
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adapt to mackerel fishing in Icelandic waters as they’ve lost access to other
species, and relatively uneager to fully abide by the rules of the existing
mackerel RFMO. While Iceland is a member of the North East Atlantic
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), they have thus far unilaterally set their
annual mackerel quotas. Iceland, Greenland, and Russia have been
gradually increasing their own quotas for their domestic fishing fleets
instead of agreeing to quotas set by the RFMO, much to the irritation of
the EU.20 The resulting diplomatic conflagration spread beyond fishing
alone, and contributed the decision by Iceland to withdraw its application
for membership into the EU. 21This chain of events is unlikely to be
unique. Pinsky et al. have predicted that fisheries that straddle political
boundaries will increase 35 percent by 2060 in an unmitigated emissions
scenario.22
Distant Water Fishing Fleets as a State Response to Climate
Change
As domestic industries face declining catches from increased consumption
and decreased supply, many will turn to their home governments for
support in adapting to these changing circumstances. This support may
include incentives for aquaculture, or job training, or myriad other
measures, but in many cases it will aim to enhance distant water fishing as
a remedy to declining catches. For example, Beijing recognized in the early
1980s that domestic marine resources were in decline, and prioritized the
development of a distant water fishing fleet as part of the solution. Many
of China’s fishing subsidies are DWF specific, and the most recent Five
Year Plan called for an expansion of the number of DWF vessels and the
total catch from outside Chinese coastal waters.23 With at least 3,000
qualifying vessels, China now operates the largest DWF fleet in the world,
representing almost 40 percent of the world’s total DWF capacity, and 36
percent of the world’s DWF fishing effort.24 Automatic Identification
System data indicates that China’s DWF fleet activity is currently heaviest
in the central and south Pacific, the western Indian Ocean, and the coast of
West Africa as well as the rest of East Asia.25 Representatives from the
DWF industry in China have supported the idea that China needs DWF to
supplement its depleted domestic waters.26
As the Chinese example indicates, DWF fleets are largely a creation of
state policy. The fact that the global catch has largely leveled off while
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fishing effort has increased substantially is a testament not only to human
technology, but to the willingness of states to bolster their fishing fleets.
Many governments subsidize their fishing industry, often through multiple
mechanisms at once. Some subsidies are aimed at conducting fishery
research and promoting the respect of marine conservation areas. Much
more common, and broadly harmful, are subsidies aimed at building
fishing capacity. One such example is the economic aid for building new
boats or modernizing existing vessels long used by the EU and China,
among others.27 Tax reduction is also common. For instance, China treats
fish landings from DWF fleets as domestic, and thus not subject to import
taxes. Fuel subsidies are by far the most substantial example, especially in
the case of DWF fleets, for whom fuel is often the most substantial cost of
operation. Of the $6.5 billion in fishing subsidies that Beijing doled out in
2013, for example, 94 percent was in the form of fuel subsidies.28 Most
dependent of all upon subsidies are the distant water fishing fleets that
many states have turned to in order to maintain their place in the global
fish market. Indeed, a substantial portion of DWF activities by the world’s
largest fleets (China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and Spain) would be
entirely unprofitable without the aid of subsidies from their home
governments.29 This is especially significant given that these five countries
represent 90 percent of the world’s current DWF fishing vessels.30
Furthermore, the trend in recent decades has been for fishing subsidies to
rise, and many subsidies have been difficult to remove even under public
criticism. China’s total fuel subsidies for fishing increased more than
11,000 percent between 2006 and 2013, for example.31 Even when fishing
subsidies have come under public criticism, such as in the European
Union, pressure from domestic fishing industries and local regions
dependent on them has made subsidies difficult to remove.32 Indeed,
negotiations to remove subsidies that enhance fishing capacity have been
ongoing within the World Trade Organization (WTO) for several years.
China and certain subsets of the European Union have been loath to come
to a strong agreement on this front, and the most likely line of compromise
will be that only the developing world will continue to subsidize their
fishing industry.33 This too may provide a future loophole, as existing
DWF fleets may be transferred via foreign flagging of vessels to the
developing world, whereby subsidies could conceivable continue in much
the same way. This is effectively how some Chinese DWF fleets already
operate in West Africa. Dalian Mengxin Ocean Fisheries, a Chinese state101
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affiliated firm, owns and operates thirty or more fishing trawlers in the
EEZs of Ghana and Sierra Leone. Many of these vessels are registered
within Ghana as belonging to local shell companies, who take a cut of the
overall proceeds. Indeed, 90 percent of the trawling vessels registered in
Ghana are Chinese owned and crewed. Such arrangements allow firms like
Dalian Mengxin to effectively collect subsidies from the Chinese state
while accessing Ghanaian fisheries, and it is not clear that the currently
discussed WTO agreement will prevent this.34
Of course, states may effectively bolster social harms from fishing in other
capacities as well. Home governments may come to the aid of citizens
caught fishing illegally in foreign or contested waters. This may take a
number of forms, from legal pressure to military action. For example,
Beijing has attempted to negotiate on behalf of Chinese fishermen who
were caught overfishing within the EEZs of Indonesia and other Southeast
Asian states.35 At the other end of the spectrum are the naval escorts that
the United Kingdom provided to UK fishing vessels during the Cod Wars
with Iceland in the 1970s, culminating in forcible ramming and the
exchange of fire between two erstwhile NATO allies.
DWF Fleets and Fishery Conflict
A global expansion of distant water fishing fleets is suboptimal for a
number of reasons. For one, it is likely to accelerate overfishing, as each
fleet attempts to mop up what it can before their competition does so.
DWF fleets tend to be especially adept at engaging in IUU fishing activities
on a large scale. For one, such vessels typically operate far from shore.
Analysis of recent Automatic Identification System (AIS) data from ships
shows that DWF vessels are most active on the high seas and in the EEZs
of the developing world.36 In other words, DWF fleets are most likely to
operate in places of minimal governance and limited enforcement
capacity. Most DWF fleets include reefer or factory ships that can take a
cargo of raw fish from smaller vessels and process them at sea before
taking them to foreign markets. This practice is known as transshipment,
and it allows the fishing ships themselves to remain at sea and continue to
catch fish rather than return to port. Because ports are where most
accounting of catches can occur, transshipment tends to be opaque, and
makes it easy to obscure the actual catch of a ship within a given area.
Thus, even if a state has come to an agreement with a foreign power for
access to a particular EEZ, transshipment makes it possible to obscure
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how much fish were actually caught. Indeed, it is widely believed that
transshipment has allowed China’s DWF fleet to pass much of its catch as
domestic, thereby allowing it to launder the proceeds of overfishing on the
high seas and foreign EEZs.37 China’s total distant water catch is likely to
be substantially higher than what is officially reported.38 Furthermore,
state-supported DWF fleets often rely on a large number of nearly
identical ships that were produced at the same time, and are often given
names that vary only by a single letter or number. This makes it more
difficult for authorities to identify a particular vessel accused of IUU
practices correctly. It is also easier to quickly change vessel names to avoid
prosecution, a practice that is not uncommon in the world of IUU
fishing.39 Higher fish prices in the wake of climate change will increase the
short term benefits of IUU practices for DWF fleets, and thus they are
likely to continue. This is significant given that IUU fishing is already
substantial, estimated at $9 to $17 billion a year in fish alone, or between
$26 billion and $50 billion if the full economic effects are included.40
Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing is particularly problematic
from a fisheries conflict perspective. A larger number of distant water
fishing vessels means a larger number of competitive actors in fisheries
across the globe, which is likely to complicate the operation of RFMOs.
Distant fishing vessels may come from countries that are not party to
existing fisheries management, and may feel little compunction about
following such rules when they are far from their home government.
RFMOs typically set a catch ceiling for a given year and then allot a certain
level of catch to each of the agreeing stakeholders. Illegal fishing reduces
the amount of sustainable catch available to everyone else, with the result
that even legitimate actors will be unwittingly overfishing. While
agreements can be adjusted to reflect new realities, the industrial nature of
state supported DWF fleets means that enormous amounts of fish can be
removed in a relatively short period. Thus, it is possible that a given
fishery could be grossly overfished or decimated before RFMO actors have
a chance to respond, especially in areas with limited governance or
enforcement. The ease by which DWF fleets can engage in IUU fishing
could potentially destabilize managed fisheries even when IUU is not
occurring. The general lack of transparency around distant water fishing
practices is likely to lead to suspicions of IUU fishing by other actors,
whether justified or not, and the presence of foreign actors may present a
convenient scapegoat for declining local catches.
103
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/7
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1869

Kelman: Climate Change and Fishery Conflict

The use of state supported DWF fleets is also significant because disputes
may be followed with military protection or intervention by the home
state. Spijkers et al. found that states were most likely to respond to fishery
disputes with displays of “hard-line power.”41 The use of the British navy
for protection of fishing vessels in Icelandic waters during the Cod Wars is
one example. Note too that China maintains the People’s Armed Forces
Maritime Militia (PAFMM), which has been used to reinforce fishing
access in disputed areas of the South China Sea. Vietnam has deployed a
similar service for its own fishing fleet.42 Some analysts have argued that
fishing access may serve as a proxy for extraction of minerals or future
militarization.43 For example, Chinese fishing vessels receive a stipend to
conduct their activities in the disputed South China Sea, despite a general
lack of fishing profitability in that area currently.44 At the very least, the
reach of DWF fleets means that the home state can plausibly justify
military protection of their fishing vessels on a wider geographic scale.
State investment in DWF fleets is also likely to create or reinforce a
domestic constituency that is dependent on said subsidies for economic
survival. This not only makes such subsidies politically difficult to remove,
but may also increase domestic pressure on the state to protect or expand
fishery access abroad. Such a state would be more likely to intervene
militarily to protect their large-scale investments in DWF.
Conclusion: An Avoidable Outcome
Climate change does not bode well for human conflict in general, and for
fisheries conflict in particular. That said, it should be noted that increased
reliance on DWF fleets and fisheries conflict are not foregone conclusions.
The beggar-thy-neighbor nature of DWF development is not the only
potential solution to declining catches. Indeed, there are a number of other
methods of avoiding a classic tragedy-of-the-commons scenario, and
several developments on the horizon may further ameliorate global
fisheries. States may choose to bolster domestic aquaculture, establish and
enforce protected marine zones to bolster aquatic populations, and take
other actions to ensure that catch does not exceed sustainable yield within
their EEZs. Where EEZs overlap and on the open ocean, states can choose
to establish RFMOs to cooperatively enact much of the same protective
policy to ensure that they can continue to catch fish well into the future,
even in a warming ocean. Improved monitoring, control, and surveillance
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has the potential to better police the high seas and jurisdictions with poor
governance. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the research of Park et
al., who used widely available commercial satellite photography to monitor
the fishing activities within the notoriously opaque waters of North
Korea.45 However, even the universal use of Vessel Monitoring Systems
(VMS), especially if enforced by the maritime insurance industry, would
greatly improve the transparency of DWF.46 Most importantly, the upside
to the role of state-supported DWF fleets in promoting fishery conflict is
that the state support can be removed. More than half of current DWF
activity would be uneconomic without state activity, and thus it is likely
that many would cease to operate if such subsidies were removed. 47 Thus,
the outcome and compliance of current WTO talks of eliminating fishery
subsidies is of great importance, especially on a rapidly warming planet.
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